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Abstract. We propose a market solution to the problem of resource allocation
subject to constraints, such as considerations of diversity or geographical distri-
bution. Constraints give rise to pecuniary externalities, which are internalized via
prices. Agents pay to the extent that their purchases affect the value (at equi-
librium prices) of the relevant constraints. The result is a constrained-efficient
market equilibrium outcome. The outcome is fair whenever the constraints do not
single out individual agents, which happens, for example with geographical dis-
tribution constraints. In economies with endowments, moreover, we can address
participation constraints. Our equilibrium outcomes are then constrained efficient
and approximately individually rational.
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1. Introduction
We analyze the use of pseudo-markets for assignment problems with constraints.
A pseudo-market is an artificial marketplace in which agents are given fixed budgets
of “funny money” that is only useful within the marketplace. Pseudo-markets were
proposed by Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979), who consider the allocation of indivis-
ible objects to an equal number of unit-demand agents. Their running example is
to assign workers to jobs.
We generalize and expand the scope of applicability of pseudo markets. We deal
with general assignment problems under constraints. For example the assignment
of workers to jobs under regional “celing” and “floor” quotas (Kamada and Kojima,
2015); upper bounds on assignments due to considerations of gender or demographic
balance (Ehlers, Hafalir, Yenmez, and Yildirim, 2014); or participation constraints
that arise from a pre-existing allocation. Our approach handles models that had
not been analyzed via markets before, such as the well-known roommate problem
from matching theory, and coalition formation problems.
Given a general set of constraints, and under standard continuity and convexity
assumptions, pseudo-markets deliver (constrained) efficient outcomes in equilibrium.
When constraints do not single out any particular agent, the equilibrium is efficient
and fair; and when agents start out with property rights over initial endowments,
we can achieve efficiency and approximate individual rationality.
The key idea in our proposal is to price constraints. Think of two workers, Alice
and Bob, in Hylland and Zeckhauser’s (HZ) pseudo-market. Jobs are in fixed supply.
If Alice buys a share in job J, there is less left for Bob. Such “pecuniary” externalities
are handled in markets by pricing good J. In our proposal, we think of the price
of good J as the price on the supply constraint for job J: the constraint that says
that the total demand for good J cannot exceed the available supply. HZ show
that pecuniary externalities are correctly internalized by equilibrium prices, and
that an efficient outcome results in equilibrium.1 In the present paper, we interpret
all sorts of constraints, well beyond supply constraints, as giving rise to pecuniary
externalities. In consequence, we use prices to align agents’ choices with an efficient
outcome.
1In models where there are only supply constraints, this is the message of the first welfare
theorem. In HZ’s model, however, there are also unit demand constraints and the first welfare
theorem fails.
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Specifically, we start from a general collection of feasible assignments as our prim-
itive.2 We use linear inequalities to characterize the “upper-right” boundary of the
convex hull of feasible assignments. These linear inequalities include the standard
supply constraints, but specific applications usually require additional constraints.
Each constraint is then priced. When Alice purchases one unit of good J, she will
have to pay to the extent that her purchase affects other agents through the different
constraints. For example, if there is a ceiling constraint on how many units of J can
go to a group of agents, the agents in the group will pay the price of the constraint
when they buy units of J. If those agents are also involved in other constraints, then
the final personalized prices they face can be different. But if two agents are always
involved in the same constraints, they will face equal prices. Equal budgets then
ensure that they will not envy each other.
The idea may seem familiar from the role of shadow prices in optimization with
constraints, but the familiarity is deceptive. Imagine using the dual variables (or
Lagrange multipliers) associated with each constraint in order to decentralize an
allocation that is constrained efficient. We run into two issues. One is that some
constraints may impose a lower bound on consumed quantities, which would lead
to negative prices. The other is that decentralizing a constrained efficient alloca-
tion would require transfers, as in the second welfare theorem.3 With endogenous
transfers, one cannot ensure a fair outcome. Or one that is individually rational
when there are endowments. Our approach, in contrast, can ensure fairness and
individual rationality because our prices constitute market equilibria. We first sim-
plify the problem by working with a subset of the constraints, and ensure that they
have positive prices (Sections 2.5 and 3). Individual rationality can be ensured when
agents have endowments (Section 7). And, as long as the constraints do not them-
selves induce unfairness by treating agents differently, it is possible to obtain a fair
outcome in equilibrium.
2We differ from the literature in that we do not take a constraint structure as the primitive
in our model. The influential work by Budish, Che, Kojima, and Milgrom (2013) and the recent
development by Akbarpour and Nikzad (forthcoming) are concerned with the implementability of
random assignments. Our work is orthogonal to the question of implementability. We can address
any constraints that pin down a well-defined set of feasible ex-post assignments.
3We discuss the second welfare theorem without transfers developed by Miralles and Pycia
(2020) in the related literature section (Section 8). Note that the outcome of the second welfare
theorem may induce envy, even in a textbook economy with no constraints other than the supply
constraints.
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We turn to a discussion of specific applications that motivate our approach, and
where our results deliver new insights.
1.1. Motivation.
1.1.1. Matching workers to jobs. HZ illustrated the use of pseudo-markets by way
of assigning jobs to a set of workers. Each worker is to receive at most one job, what
we call a unit demand constraint. Each job is in unit supply, so the sum of workers
assigned a particular job cannot exceed one: what we call a supply constraint. As
we shall see, constraints that only involve an individual agent, such as unit demand
constraints, have no external effects and do not need to be priced. Constraints that
involve multiple agents, such as supply constraints, will be assigned a price. When
an agent purchases a good, she has to pay to the extent that the purchase impacts
the constraints that are priced.
Importantly, there is one supply constraint for each good. The price that corre-
sponds to the supply constraint for good l is the familiar “price of good l.” Think of
the constraint as capturing a pecuniary externality. When Alice purchases good l,
the supply constraint implies that there is less good l available for Bob. By pricing
supply constraints we ensure that Alice internalizes the effects that her purchases
has on Bob. As we shall see, in problems with more complex constraint structures,
we may not be able to ascribe a specific good to each specific price; but the logic of
using prices to internalize the external effects induced by constraints extends.
In the workers-to-jobs application, priced constraints affect all agents in the same
way. As a consequence, the prices are equal for all agents, and we can show the
existence of a market equilibrium outcome that is both efficient and fair.
Finally, the methodology in our paper extends the HZ approach to situations
with multiple unit assignment; see Section 5.2 (Budish (2012) gives an overview of
multi-unit assignment).4
1.1.2. Assigning doctors to hospital positions. The problem of assigning each doctor
a hospital position is similar to the workers-to-jobs example, but with an important
twist. Hospitals belong to different geographical regions, and the system seeks to
ensure a minimum number of doctors per region (Kamada and Kojima, 2015). So
we have unit demand and supply constraints as before; but there is now a lower
bound —a floor constraint— on the number of doctors assigned to each region. Our
4In multi-unit assignment, the relevant set of constraints that need to be priced does not nec-
essarily coincide with the set of items or the set of bundles. See Section 5.2 for a brief discussion.
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solution involves turning these constraints into upper bounds (see Section 4.3 for
details).
There are then two kinds of non-individual constraints that must be priced: supply
constraints and the modified floor constraints. When Alice buys into a popular
hospital position, she causes a pecuniary externality on Bob, who may have to take
a position in a less-demanded regional hospital. The price on the corresponding
modified floor constraint ensures that she pays more for the popular hospital than
if she were only facing the supply constraint. In an equilibrium, now, prices ensure
that demand spills over into the less attractive regions so as to meet the lower bound
for each region.
In the doctors-to-hospitals application, again, all agents are treated in the same
way by the priced constraints. In consequence, all agents face the same prices,
and we obtain a market equilibrium that is fair and efficient. The application to
hospital-doctor matching with regional constraints is discussed in Section 4.
1.1.3. Roommates. A set of college students need to pair up as roommates. Each
student has a utility function defined over her possible roommates. We formulate
the model as an assignment problem, where we assign objects to agents by treating
the set of objects as a copy of the set of agents. Each student has two roles: one
as agent seeking to match to an object, and one as object that can be matched to
different agents. In addition to the familiar unit demand and supply constraints,
we must now impose a symmetry property. If agent Alice is matched to object
Bob, then agent Bob must be matched to object Alice. The symmetry constraints
involve more than one agent, and must therefore be priced. When Alice purchases
some of the “Bob good” she is committing Bob to consume an equal amount of the
“Alice good.” In our pseudo-market, this pecuniary external effect is internalized
via prices.
Our results deliver an efficient equilibrium in the market for roommates. Our
finding is significant because it is well known that stable matchings may not exist
in the model of roommates. Market equilibria capture a different notion of stability,
one that is not game theoretic in nature, ensuring that agents are optimizing at the
equilibrium outcome.
The application to roommates is discussed in Section 5, where we also outline
how pseudo-markets can be used in more general matching and coalition formation
problems.
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1.1.4. Re-allocation of an existing assignment. Consider a system that starts from a
pre-existing allocation, for example assigning teachers to schools (Combe, Tercieux, and Terrier,
2018), offices to university faculty (Baccara, Imrohoroglu, Wilson, and Yariv, 2012),
or upper-class students to dorms (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 1999). We seek to
re-assign the objects while ensuring each agent that they are not worse off than
under the pre-existing allocation. The reason could be political. Re-assignment
problems often need to overcome political economy obstacles stemming from an ex-
isting assignment. By ensuring that agents are not made worse off, the political
problem is avoided.
Our results allow agents to obtain market income from the value of their endow-
ment at equilibrium prices. In consequence, we can not only achieve efficiency, but
also satisfy the participation constraints implied by the presence of endowments.
It is crucial, we show, that not all income is derived from the endowment: some
income must have the same external source as in HZ.
Endowments and participation constraints are discussed in Section 7.
1.2. Related literature. Constrained resource allocation has received a lot of at-
tention in recent years. The work by Kojima, Sun, and Yu (2020), Gul, Pesendorfer, and Zhang
(2019) and ours seems to be the first to look at constrained allocation by way
of a market mechanism. The former two papers study the role of gross substi-
tutes in a general model of discrete allocation. Despite a similar focus on mar-
kets and constraints, the results in our papers are very different; see Section 8
for more details. In studying constraints, we are motivated by the early work of
Budish, Che, Kojima, and Milgrom (2013), Ehlers, Hafalir, Yenmez, and Yildirim (2014)
and Kamada and Kojima (2015). Our results apply to the same kind of constraints
they consider, but we differ substantially in methodology. Aside from how we deal
with constraints, our approach to generating income from endowments is closely
related to, but distinct from, Mas-Colell (1992), Le (2017), and McLennan (2018).
We provide a detailed discussion of the related literature in Section 8, once our
results have been explained. We also provide a detailed comparison with other work
on the pseudo-market mechanism in that section.
2. The model
2.1. Notational conventions. For vectors x, y ∈ Rn, x ≤ y means that xi ≤ yi
for all i = 1, . . . , n; x < y means that x ≤ y and x 6= y; and x ≪ y means that
xi < yi for all i = 1, . . . , n. The set of all x ∈ R
n with 0 ≤ x is denoted by Rn+, and
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the set of all x ∈ Rn with 0≪ x is denoted by Rn++. Inner products are denoted as
x · y =
∑
i xiyi.
Let X ⊆ Rn be convex. A function u : X → R is
• quasi-concave if for any x, z ∈ X and λ ∈ [0, 1],
min{u(z), u(x)} ≤ u(λz + (1− λ)x).
• semi-strictly quasi-concave if it is quasi-concave, and for any x, z ∈ X and
λ ∈ (0, 1), u(z) 6= u(x) implies that
min{u(z), u(x)} < u(λz + (1− λ)x).5
• concave if, for any x, z ∈ X and λ ∈ (0, 1),
λu(z) + (1− λ)u(x) ≤ u(λz + (1− λ)x).
• expected utility if there exists a vector v ∈ Rn with u(x) = v ·x for all x ∈ X .
• strictly increasing if x > x′ implies that u(x) > u(x′).
Given a set A ⊆ Rn, let co(A) denote the convex hull of A in Rn: the intersection
of all convex sets that contain A.
A pair (a, b), with a ∈ Rn and b ∈ R, defines a linear inequality a · x ≤ b. We say
that a linear inequality (a, b) has non-negative coefficients if a ≥ 0 and b ≥ 0. Any
linear inequality (a, b) defines a (closed) half-space {x ∈ Rn : a · x ≤ b}.
A polyhedron in Rn is a set that is the intersection of a finite number of closed
half-spaces. A polytope in Rn is a bounded polyhedron. Two special polytopes are
the simplex in Rn:
∆n = {x ∈ Rn+ :
n∑
l=1
xl = 1},
and the subsimplex
∆n− = {x ∈ R
n
+ :
n∑
l=1
xl ≤ 1}.
When n is understood, we use the notation ∆ and ∆−.
5See Avriel, Diewert, Schaible, and Zang (2010) for a discussion of semi-strictly quasi-concave
functions and their applications to economics.
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2.2. The economy. We first introduce a model without endowments. It is simpler,
and goes a long way to capture the applications we have discussed. In Section 7 we
augment the model to include agents’ endowments.
An economy is a tuple Γ = (I, O, (Zi, ui)i∈I , (ql)l∈O), where
• I is a finite set of agents, with N = |I|;
• O is a finite set of objects, with L = |O|;
• Zi ⊆ R
L
+ is i’s consumption space;
• ui : Zi → R is i’s utility function;
• ql ∈ R++ is the amount of l ∈ O.
In an economy, N = |I| is the number of agents, and L = |O| is the number of
different objects. Each object l ∈ O is available in quantity ql.
An assignment in Γ is a vector
x = (xi,l)i∈I,l∈O with xi ∈ Zi,
where xi,l is the amount of object l received by agent i. Let A denote the set of all
assignments in Γ.
In discrete allocation problems we often interpret assignments as probabilistic
allocations: see Section 2.4. In this case, xi,l is the probability that agent i receives
an object l.
For now we restrict attention to Zi = R
L
+, but agents’ consumption spaces will
be restricted further as we introduce constraints.
2.3. Constraints. A constrained allocation problem is a pair (Γ, C) in which Γ is an
economy and C is a subset of the assignments in Γ. The assignments in C constitute
the assignments that satisfy the constraints: the feasible assignments in (Γ, C).
Observe that the set of constrained assignments is a primitive of the model. In-
stead of starting from an explicit description of how assignments are constrained,
we work directly with the set C of feasible assignments. Throughout the paper we
require that C be a polytope.
In Section 4.1 we show how to apply our results to a model with explicit constraint
structures as the primitive.
Our model applies to environments with infinitely divisible objects. In Section 7,
for example, we obtain the textbook model of an exchange economy as a special
case. Most market design applications, however, require indivisible objects. We
proceed to introduce some language that is pertinent to the indivisible case.
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2.4. Special case: discrete allocation. In many market design applications, ob-
jects are indivisible, and randomization over deterministic assignments is used to
ensure fairness. In these applications, we say that an assignment x is deterministic
if every xi,l is an integer. When an assignment is not deterministic we call it a
random assignment.
Constraints are often imposed as linear inequalities on deterministic assignments.
For example, the usual unit-demand constraints require that
∑
l∈O xi,l ≤ 1 for all i ∈
I, and the supply constraints require that
∑
i∈I xi,l ≤ ql for all l ∈ O. A deterministic
assignment is feasible if it satisfies all such constraints. A random assignment is
feasible if it belongs to the convex hull of feasible deterministic assignments. Thus
we obtain C from the set of feasible deterministic assignments. Observe that C is a
polytope, as the number of feasible deterministic assignments is finite.
Under unit demand and supply constraints, the Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem
and its generalizations guarantee that every random assignment is a randomization
over deterministic assignments. Budish, Che, Kojima, and Milgrom (2013) general-
ize this theorem by characterizing constraint structures that ensure the implemen-
tation of feasible random assignments: we use their model in Section 4.1. By taking
C as a primitive, we circumvent the implementation issue.
2.5. Pre-processing of constraints. Our approach involves pricing constraints,
but not all constraints get a price. For example, in HZ, unit demand constraints
are not priced. Only supply constraints get a price. Here we proceed with a gen-
eral constrained allocation problem (Γ, C), and “pre-process” C so as to obtain the
constraints that have to be assigned a price.
Recall that C is a polytope. Define the lower contour set of C to be
lcs(C) = {x ∈ RNL+ : ∃x
′ ∈ C such that x ≤ x′}.
Lemma 1. There exists a finite set Ω of linear inequalities with non-negative coef-
ficients such that
lcs(C) =
⋂
(a,b)∈Ω
{x ∈ RLN+ : a · x ≤ b}.
6
Proof. Consider
D = {x′ ∈ RNL : x′ ≤ x for some x ∈ C}
6Lemma 1 is used by Balbuzanov (2019) to define a generalization of the probabilistic serial
mechanism that accommodates constraints.
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and note that lcs(C) = D∩RNL+ . Write D as C−R
NL
+ ; thus, since C is a polytope, D
is finitely generated. Then by Theorem 19.1 in Rockafellar (1970) D is polyhedral,
and therefore the intersection of finitely many halfspaces. Let Ω be the set of linear
inequalities (a, b) defining this collection of halfspaces, so for each (a, b) ∈ Ω we have
the halfspace {x′ ∈ RNL : a · x′ ≤ b}. Since for each i and l there is x′ ∈ D with
arbitrarily small x′i,l, we must have a ≥ 0. If C = {0} we may take b = 0. If there is
x ∈ C with x > 0 then b ≥ 0. Hence Ω defines a finite collection of linear inequalities
with non-negative coefficients.
To finish the proof, note that if z ∈ D \ lcs(C) then z /∈ RNL+ . 
For any c = (a, b) ∈ Ω, define the support of c to be
supp(c) = {(i, l) ∈ I ×O : ai,l > 0}.
Let ai = (ai,l)l∈O be the vector of coefficients relevant to i in (a, b).
Given that C is nonempty, there are two types of inequalities (a, b) ∈ Ω: those
with b = 0 and those with b > 0. If b = 0, then for any x ∈ C we must have
xi,l = 0 for all (i, l) ∈ supp(c). We can, without loss of generality, assume that
there is exactly one such inequality; because two inequalities (a, 0), (a′, 0) ∈ Ω can
be substituted by ((max{ai,l, a
′
i,l}), 0), and if there is no inequality with b = 0 in Ω
then we can include the trivial inequality (0, 0) in Ω. Thus we can let (a0, 0) ∈ Ω be
the unique inequality with b = 0. When (a0, 0) is nontrivial, it forbids some agents
from consuming certain objects. We say that l is a forbidden object for agent i when
a0i,l > 0.
Among the remaining inequalities Ω\{(a0, 0)}, we say (a, b) is an individual con-
straint for agent i if for all j 6= i and l ∈ O, aj,l = 0. In words, (a, b) only restricts
i’s consumption. Let Ωi denote the set of all individual constraints for i. We use
(a0, 0) and individual constraints to refine i’s consumption space. Let Xi be the set
of vectors xi ∈ Zi such that xi,l = 0 if l is a forbidden object for i and xi satisfies
all of i’s individual constraints. That is,
Xi = {xi ∈ Zi : a
0
i · xi ≤ 0 and ai · xi ≤ b for all (a, b) ∈ Ω
i}.
Let Ω∗ = Ω\
(
{(a0, 0)}
⋃
∪i∈IΩ
i
)
collect all constraints that involve more than one
agent. Including, for example, any supply constraints. The elements of Ω∗ will be
“priced.” By pricing these constraints we seek to ensure that one agent’s pecuniary
externality on others, imposed via the constraints present in C, are internalized.
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2.6. Normative properties. Given a constrained allocation problem (Γ, C), we
analyze constrained versions of efficiency and fairness: the efficiency and fairness
properties that can be achieved subject to how assignments are constrained.
A feasible assignment x ∈ C is weakly C-constrained Pareto efficient if there is
no feasible assignment y ∈ C such that ui(yi) > ui(xi) for all i. And x ∈ C is
C-constrained Pareto efficient if there is no feasible assignment y ∈ C such that
ui(yi) ≥ ui(xi) for all i with a strict inequality for at least one agent.
Fairness rules out envy among agents who are treated symmetrically by the prim-
itive constraints. We say that two agents i and j are of equal type if Xi = Xj and,
for all (a, b) ∈ Ω∗, ai = aj . An agent i envies another agent j at an assignment x if
ui(xj) > ui(xi). An assignment x ∈ C is envy-free if no agent envies another agent
at x, and equal-type envy-free if no agent envies another agent of equal type at x.
2.7. Equilibrium. For each constraint c = (a, b) ∈ Ω∗, we introduce a price pc.
When agent i purchases xi,l, she affects other agents’ purchases through the role of
ai,l in constraint c. Prices are meant to internalize such effects, just as the price of
good l classically internalizes the effect that i has on other agents through the supply
constraint for good l. Given a price vector p = (pc)c∈Ω∗ ∈ R
Ω∗ , the personalized
price vector faced by any agent i ∈ I is defined to be pi = (pi,l)
L
l=1 such that
pi,l =
∑
(a,b)∈Ω∗
ai,lp(a,b).
Remark 1. If agents i and j are of equal type, then pi = pj . Thus prices are only
personalized to the extent that constraints are personalized. We present several
applications where all agents face the same prices.
A pair (x∗, p∗) is a pseudo-market equilibrium for (Γ, C) if
(1) x∗i ∈ argmaxxi∈Xi{ui(xi) : p
∗
i · xi ≤ 1};
(2) x∗ ∈ C;
(3) For any c = (a, b) ∈ Ω∗, a · x∗ < b implies that p∗c = 0.
3. Main theorem
For constrained allocation problems without endowments, our main result is:
Theorem 1. Suppose that agents’ utility functions are continuous, quasi-concave
and strictly increasing.
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• There exists a pseudo-market equilibrium (x∗, p∗) in which x∗ is weakly C-
constrained Pareto efficient.
• If agents’ utility functions are semi-strictly quasi-concave, there exists a
pseudo-market equilibrium (x∗, p∗) in which x∗ is C-constrained Pareto ef-
ficient.
• Every pseudo-market equilibrium assignment is equal-type envy-free.
Theorem 1 is implied by our more general result, Theorem 2 in Section 7. We
should emphasize that the first welfare theorem does not hold in our model: one
can exhibit examples of Pareto inefficient pesudo-market equilibria, and even of
Pareto-ranked equilibrium allocations. Crucial to Theorem 1 is the cheapest bundle
property: (x, p) satisfies the cheapest-bundle property if, for each i, xi minimizes
expenditure pi · zi among all the zi ∈ Xi for which ui(zi) = ui(xi). The cheapest
bundle property, and its role in obtaining efficiency, was already established by HZ.
We show the existence of a pseudo-market equilibrium with the cheapest-bundle
property, which in consequence is C-constrained Pareto efficient.
4. Application: Discrete object allocation under constraints
Our first application is to the problem of assigning indivisible objects, as in Sec-
tion 2.4. We seek fair and efficient random assignments subject to constraints. Each
object l ∈ O is available in fixed integer supply, and each agent demands at most
one copy of any object.
We explicitly describe constraints by way of the constraint structures introduced
by Budish, Che, Kojima, and Milgrom (2013). Many constraints in real-life alloca-
tion problems can be described through such structures.
4.1. Constraint structures. A constraint is defined by a triple (S, q
S
, qS), where
S ⊂ I × O is a subset of agent-object pairs, and qS = (qS, qS) is a pair of non-
negative integers with q
S
≤ qS. The integers qS and qS are respectively called floor
and ceiling quotas.
An assignment x satisfies (S, q
S
, qS) if
(1) q
S
≤
∑
(i,l)∈S
xi,l ≤ qS.
For any i ∈ I and l ∈ O, a singleton constraint (S, qS) is such that S = {(i, l)}
and qS = (0, 1). This means that i can obtain at most one copy of l. For any i ∈ I,
a row constraint (S, qS) is such that S = {i} × O and qS = (0, qi) where qi ∈ N.
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The row constraint means that i obtains at most qi objects. Unit demand is an
example of a row constraint. For any l ∈ O, a column constraint (S, qS) is such that
S = I×{l} and qS = (0, ql). This means that at most ql copies of l can be assigned.
Supply constraints are examples of column constraints.
A constraint structure H is a collection of constraints. The set of feasible assign-
ments implied by H is defined to be
C = {x ∈ RNL+ : qS ≤
∑
(i,l)∈S
xi,l ≤ qS for all (S, qS) ∈ H}.
We assume that H contains the singleton constraints for all agent-object pairs,
the row constrains for all agents and the column constraints for all objects. When
H satisfies these assumptions, we say that it is allocative.
When C is the convex hull of deterministic assignments satisfying the constraints
in H, we say that it is implementable. Budish, Che, Kojima, and Milgrom (2013)
prove that a sufficient and necessary condition for C to be implementable for all
possible quotas is that H is a bihierarchy. Formally, a constraint structure H is a
hierarchy if for every distinct S and S ′ in H, either S ⊂ S ′, or S ′ ⊂ S, or S∩S ′ = ∅.
H is a bihierarchy if there exist two hierarchies H1 and H2 such that H = H1 ∪H2
and H1 ∩ H2 = ∅. H1 is the set of sub-row, row, and sup-row constraints, while
H2 is the set of sub-column, column and sup-column constraints.
7 When H is a
bihierarchy, C is the set of feasible assignments that we take as a primitive in our
model. Then we can apply our method directly to C. In the rest of this section, we
discuss applications with bihierarchy constraints. Note, however, that our approach
is applicable to cases when H is not a bihierarchy. In such cases, one first needs
to describe the convex hull of the set of deterministic assignments that satisfy the
constraints in H.
We consider two applications of bihierarchy constraints. In the first application,
all floor quotas are zero. Then we can directly price the constraints in H. It should
be clear that singleton and row constraints do not need to be priced. Column con-
straints involve more than one agent, and thus generate pecuniary externalities that
must be internalized through prices. In the second application, there are nontrivial
floor constraints. To characterize lcs(C), we will then derive a new set of ceiling
constraints implied by the ceiling and floor constraints present in H. We discuss
7A constraint (S, qS) is a sub-row constraint if S = {i} ×O′ for some i ∈ I and O′ ⊂ O, and it
is a sup-row constraint if S = I ′×O for some I ′ ⊂ I. Sub-column and sup-column constraints are
similarly defined.
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two concrete examples to show how the new ceiling constraints are derived. The
general model can be treated much like our examples.
4.2. No floor constraints. Suppose that H is such that all floor quotas are zero.
Then C = lcs(C), and we can directly price all non-individual constraints in H: a
set that we denote by H∗. Here individual constraints consist of singleton, sub-row,
and row constraints. The set Ω∗ is
{(1S, qS) ∈ R
LN
+ ×R+ : (S, 0, qS) ∈ H
∗}.8
Under our assumptions on utilities, an efficient pseudo-market equilibrium exists
with prices for each constraint in H∗. It is interesting to discuss the fairness prop-
erties of such equilibria.
Two agents i and j are of equal type if Xi = Xj and, for all S ∈ H
∗ and l ∈ O,
(i, l) ∈ S if and only if (j, l) ∈ S. We say thatH is anonymous if every two agents are
of equal type. If H is anonymous, every constraint in H∗ must be a column or sup-
column constraint. Under anonymous constraints, every pseudo-market equilibrium
is envy-free: the strongest possible fairness property that we can obtain.
An example with anonymous constraints is the Japanese medical residency match
with regional caps studied by Kamada and Kojima (2015). Suppose that agents are
doctors and objects are hospital positions. Each constraint in H∗ takes the form(
I ×O′, (0, q¯O′)
)
where O′ ⊆ O is the set of hospitals in a geographic region (a city or a prefecture).
Here q¯O′ is the regional cap used to control the maximum number of doctors that
the region O′ can employ. A collection of such constraints is anonymous because
each constraint does not distinguish among the identities of individual doctors.
4.3. Floor constraints. Floor constraints are common in applications, but difficult
to deal with theoretically. We discuss two examples. The first is the Japanese
medical residency match mentioned above. By introducing regional caps to restrict
the number of doctors assigned to urban hospitals, the Japanese government wants
to increase the number of doctors assigned to rural hospitals. But the government’s
ideal distribution of doctors can be described by a collection of constraints with
both floor and ceiling quotas. (The regional caps described above can be motivated
through our approach to characterizing lcs(C).)
8By 1S we denote the indicator vector of the set S.
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Specifically, the hospitals O are located in K disjoint regions. Accordingly, there
is a partition of hospitals O = R1 ∪ R2 ∪ · · · ∪ RK such that every Rk is the set of
hospitals in a region. We refer to Rk as a region. For each region Rk, there is a
constraint
q
Rk
≤
∑
l∈Rk
∑
i∈I
xi,l ≤ qRk .
Assume that there are enough hospital positions to assign each doctor a position.
We can always add null hospitals when that is not the case. Also, assume that there
are enough doctors to meet all floor constraints. Below we derive the inequalities
in Ω and show that they are anonymous. Our theorem applies to deliver a pseudo-
market equilibrium that satisfies the constraints, and is efficient and envy-free.
Let R = {R1, R2, . . . , RK} denote the set of regions. For each ℓ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K},
let Rℓ be the collection of sets that are the union of ℓ distinct regions. That is,
Rℓ = {Rk1 ∪Rk2 ∪ · · · ∪ Rkℓ : {k1, k2, . . . , kℓ} ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , K}}.
In particular, R1 = R.
Consider the following inequalities
(2)


0 ≤
∑
l∈O xi,l ≤ 1 for all i ∈ I,
0 ≤
∑
i∈I xi,l ≤ ql for all l ∈ O,
0 ≤
∑
i∈I,l∈R xi,l ≤ qR for all ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , K} and R ∈ Rℓ,
where qR is (re)defined according to the following procedure:
• For every R ∈ R1, redefine the ceiling quota to be
qR = min
{
qR, N −
∑
R′∈R\{R}
q
R′
}
.
Note that qR ≥ qR because N ≥
∑
R′∈R qR′ , and qR is weakly smaller than
the original ceiling quota.
• For every R = Rk1 ∪Rk2 ∈ R2, define the ceiling quota to be
qR = min
{
qRk1
+ qRk2
, N −
∑
R′∈R\{Rk1 ,Rk2}
q
R′
}
.
• In general, for every R = Rk1 ∪Rk2 ∪ · · · ∪Rkℓ ∈ Rℓ, define the ceiling quota
to be
qR = min
{
qR\{Rkx} + qRkx for every x ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ℓ}, N −
∑
R′∈R\{Rk1 ,...,Rkℓ}
q
R′
}
.
We prove that lcs(C) is characterized by the inequalities in (2).
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Proposition 1. lcs(C) = {x ∈ RNL+ : x satifsies the inequalities in (2)}.
Proof. We denote by A the set characterized by the inequalities in (2). It is easy to
see that A = lcs(A). By the procedure to define qR, all elements of C satisfy (2). So
C ⊂ A and thus lcs(C) ⊂ A. To prove that A ⊂ lcs(C), we first prove a claim.
Claim. For every ℓ ∈ {2, . . . , K}, every R = Rk1 ∪Rk2 ∪ · · · ∪Rkℓ ∈ Rℓ, and every
x ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ},
qR ≥ qRkx
+ qR\{Rkx}.
Proof of the claim. Base case ℓ = 2: For every R = Rk1 ∪ Rk2 ∈ R2, if qR =
qRk1
+qRk2
, then the claim holds obviously. Otherwise, qR = N−
∑
R′∈R\{Rk1 ,Rk2}
q
R′
.
By definition, N −
∑
R′∈R\{Rk1}
q
R′
≥ qRk1
. So qR = N −
∑
R′∈R\{Rk1 ,Rk2}
q
R′
≥
qRk1
+
∑
R′∈R\{Rk1}
q
R′
−
∑
R′∈R\{Rk1 ,Rk2}
q
R′
= qRk1
+ q
Rk2
. Similarly, we prove that
qR ≥ qRk1
+ qRk2
.
Induction step: Suppose the claim is true for 1, 2, . . . , ℓ. Then we prove that it is
also true for ℓ+1. For any R = Rk1∪Rk2∪· · ·∪Rkℓ+1 ∈ Rℓ+1, if qR = qR\{Rkx}+qRkx
for some x ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ℓ + 1}, then it is obvious that qR ≥ qR\{Rkx} + qRkx
. By
the induction assumption, for every y 6= x, qR\{Rkx} ≥ qRky
+ qR\{Rkx ,Rky}. So
qR ≥ qRky
+ qR\{Rkx ,Rky} + qRkx ≥ qRky
+ qR\{Rky }. The claim is proved.
Otherwise, qR = N −
∑
R′∈R\{Rk1 ,...,Rkℓ+1}
q
R′
. By definition, for every x, N −∑
R′∈R\{Rk1 ,...,Rkℓ+1}∪{Rkx}
q
R′
≥ qR\{Rkx}. So qR ≥ qR\{Rkx} + qRkx
.
By induction, we are done.
Define A′ = {x ∈ A : ∄x′ ∈ A such that x < x′}. It is clear that A = lcs(A′). We
prove that A′ ⊂ C. Suppose there exists x ∈ A′ such that x /∈ C. Because x satisfies
all original ceiling constraints that define C, x must violate the floor constraint
of some Rk. That is,
∑
i∈I,l∈Rk
xi,l < qRk
. Then there must exist some doctor i
such that
∑
l∈O xi,l < 1, since otherwise
∑
i∈I,l∈O\{Rk}
xi,l = N −
∑
i∈I,l∈Rk
xi,l >
N − q
Rk
≥ qO\{Rk}, which contradicts the assumption that x ∈ A
′ ⊂ A. Because
q
Rk
≤
∑
l∈Rk
ql, there must exist l ∈ Rk such that
∑
i∈I xi,l < ql. Now consider a
new assignment x′ such that x′i,l = xi,l + ǫ where 0 < ǫ < min{1 −
∑
l∈O xi,l, ql −∑
i∈I xi,l, qRk
−
∑
i∈I,l∈Rk
xi,l}, and x
′ coincides with x in the other cells. So x < x′.
Below we prove that x′ ∈ A, which contradicts the assumption that x ∈ A′.
Suppose towards a contradiction that x′ /∈ A. Let ℓ > 1 be the smallest index
such that there exists R ∈ Rℓ with
∑
i∈I,l∈R x
′
i,l > qR. It is clear that Rk ⊂ R. By
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Claim, qR ≥ qRk
+ qR\Rk . So ∑
i∈I,l∈R
x′i,l > qRk
+ qR\Rk .
Because ǫ is chosen such that
∑
i∈I,l∈Rk
x′i,l < qRk
. So∑
i∈I,l∈R\Rk
x′i,l > qR\Rk .
But it means that
∑
i∈I,l∈R\Rk
xi,l > qR\Rk , which contradicts x ∈ A. So x
′ ∈ A. 
Besides unit demand constraints, the other inequalities in (2) do not distinguish
among the identities of doctors. So every pseudo-market equilibrium is envy-free.
The second application we discuss is controlled school choice. When implementing
school choice, a consideration for many school districts is demographic diversity. We
present a model in which the students I are simply classified into minorities Im and
majorities IM .9 Let the number of minorities be Nm and the number of majorities
be NM . Each school l has a pair of quotas (qml , q
m
l
) for minorities, and a pair of
quotas (qMl , q
M
l
) for majorities. So aside from supply constraints, each school l has
the constraints
qm
l
≤
∑
i∈Im
xi,l ≤ q
m
l ,
qM
l
≤
∑
i∈IM
xi,l ≤ q
M
l .
Of course, we assume that qm
l
+ qM
l
≤ ql.
The inequalities to characterize lcs(C) can be derived similarly to how we dealt
with regional hospitals above. The only difference is that we need to take into
account the interaction between the quotas for the two student types within each
school. After that, we can deal with the assignments for two types separately.
Formally, consider the following inequalities
(3)


0 ≤
∑
l∈O xi,l ≤ 1 for all i ∈ I,
0 ≤
∑
i∈I xi,l ≤ ql for all l ∈ O,
0 ≤
∑
i∈Im,l∈O′ xi,l ≤ q
m
O′ for all nonempty O
′ ⊂ O,
0 ≤
∑
i∈IM ,l∈O′ xi,l ≤ q
M
O′ for all nonempty O
′ ⊂ O,
where qmO′ and q
M
O′ are (re)defined as follows:
9Our arguments extend to more than two types.
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• For every l ∈ O, redefine the ceiling quotas to be
qml = min{q
m
l , ql − q
M
l
, Nm −
∑
l′∈O\{l}
qm
l′
},
qMl = min{q
M
l , ql − q
m
l
, NM −
∑
l′∈O\{l}
qM
l′
}.
• For every non-singleton O′ ⊂ O, (inductively) define the ceiling quotas to be
qmO′ = min{q
m
O′\{l} + q
m
l for every l ∈ O
′, Nm −
∑
l′∈O\O′
qm
l′
},
qMO′ = min{q
M
O′\{l} + q
M
l for every l ∈ O
′, NM −
∑
l′∈O\O′
qM
l′
}.
Similarly as before, lcs(C) is characterized by the inequalities in (3).
Proposition 2. lcs(C) = {x ∈ RNL+ : x satifsies the inequalities in (3)}.
The proof of Proposition 2 is similar to that of Proposition 1 and thus omitted.
Note that besides unit demand constraints, the other inequalities in (3) do not
distinguish among the identities of the students of each type. So every pseudo-
market equilibrium is envy-free among the students of each type. That is, minority
students will not envy other minority students, and majority students will not envy
other majority students.
5. A market for roommates, and other problems
Our model accommodates very general assignment problems with constraints, in-
cluding models with non-implementable constraints. We discuss coalition formation
problem as an illustration of the power of our approach.
First we consider the roommate model, arguably the best-known example in
matching theory where game-theoretic stability solutions fail to exist. As a corollary
of our main theorem, we obtain the existence of efficient pseudo-market equilibrium
assignments. Equilibria embody a form of stability: optimizing agents do not want
to change their behavior in the market. In this sense, our results offer a possible
way out of the non-existence of stable matchings.
Consider a set of agents I that constitute the potential roommates or partners.
Let O be a copy of I, so N = L, and think of i ∈ O as the alter ego of agent i ∈ I.
If x is an assignment, interpret xi,j = 1 as agents i and j forming a partnership, or
becoming roommates. When i is alone without a roommate, we have xi,i = 1. In
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consequence, we restrict attention to assignments x where xi,j = xj,i, meaning that
the matrix (xi,j)i∈I,j∈I is symmetric.
We say that an assignment x is a matching if (1) xi,j ∈ {0, 1} for all (i, j) ∈
I × I, (2) x is symmetric, (3) x satisfies the unit demand constraints with equality
(
∑
j xi,j = 1) and (4) x satisfies the allocation constraints with equality (
∑
i xi,j =
1). Define C to be the convex hull of all matchings.
Note that C is not equal to the set of symmetric assignments that satisfy the unit
demand and allocation constraints, dropping the integrality constraint xi,j ∈ {0, 1}.
Katz (1970) proves that the latter set is the convex hull of all matrices of the form
(1/2)(P + P ′) (P ′ is the transpose of P ) where P is a permutation matrix with
no even cycles greater than 2. A celebrated result of Edmonds (1965) provides a
characterization of C, which we use in the proof of Proposition 3 below.
To operationalize our approach, we need to work out the set of inequalities Ω for
the roommates problem. To this end, let F be the set of subsets F ⊆ I × I such
that (1) for all i, (i, i) /∈ F and (2) for every (i, j) ∈ F , (j, i) /∈ F . For each F ∈ F ,
let GF be the graph with vertex set I and edge set {{i, j} : (i, j) ∈ F or (j, i) ∈ F}.
Denote the cardinality of the maximum independent edge set of GF by kF . For
every i ∈ I, let Ji be the set of subsets J ⊂ ({i}× I)∪ (I ×{i}) such that (i, i) ∈ J
and for every j 6= i, either (i, j) ∈ J or (j, i) ∈ J but not both. Then lcs(C) is
characterized by the following inequalities.
Proposition 3.
lcs(C) =
( ⋂
∅6=F∈F
{x ∈ RI×I+ :
∑
(i,j)∈F
xi,j ≤ kF}
)⋂( ⋂
i∈I,J∈Ji
{x ∈ RI×I+ :
∑
(i′,j′)∈J
xi′,j′ ≤ 1}
)
.
Proof. Let D denote the set on the right-hand side of the proposition. We first prove
that D ⊂ lcs(C). For every x ∈ D, consider the matrix x′ obtained by letting x′i,j =
max{xi,j, xj,i} for all (i, j) ∈ I× I. Then x
′ is symmetric and x ≤ x′. We prove that
x′ ∈ D. For any ∅ 6= F ∈ F , suppose to the contrary that
∑
(i,j)∈F x
′
i,j > kF . Then
we define F ′ ⊂ I × I such that for every (i, j) ∈ F , if xi,j ≥ xj,i, let (i, j) ∈ F
′, and
otherwise let (j, i) ∈ F ′. So GF ′ and GF have the same (undirected) edge set, and
thus kF = kF ′. However,
∑
(i,j)∈F ′ xi,j =
∑
(i,j)∈F x
′
i,j > kF ′, which contradicts that
x ∈ D. Similarly we can prove that for every i and every J ∈ Ji,
∑
(i′,j′)∈J x
′
i′,j′ ≤ 1.
Thus, x′ ∈ D.
Now define another matrix y by (1) for every (i, j) ∈ I × I with i 6= j, set
yi,j = x
′
i,j, and (2) for every i ∈ I, yi,i = 1 −
∑
j 6=i x
′
i,j . It is clear that y is
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symmetric and that x′ ≤ y (as {i} × I ∈ Ji). For any F ∈ F , (i, i) /∈ F ; hence∑
(i,j)∈F yi,j =
∑
(i,j)∈F x
′
i,j ≤ kF . Since x
′ is symmetric and x′ ∈ D, for every i and
every J ∈ Ji,
∑
(i′,j′)∈J yi′,j′ = 1. So y ∈ D and it is a bistochastic matrix.
Now we prove that y ∈ C. Edmonds (1965) proves that a symmetric bistochastic
matrix z belongs to C if and only if for every r ∈ N and every I ′ ⊂ I with |I ′| = 2r+1,∑
(i,j)∈F zi,j ≤ r, where F ⊂ I
′×I ′ is such that there does not exist (i, i) ∈ F and for
every (i, j) ∈ I ′× I ′ with i 6= j, either (i, j) ∈ F or (j, i) ∈ F but not both. For any
such F , kF = r because I
′ is odd and we can form r pairs among the 2r elements
of I ′ that can be paired. Since F ∈ F , then, y satisfies Edmonds’ inequalities and
thus y ∈ C. Since x ≤ x′ ≤ y, x ∈ lcs(C). This means that D ⊂ lcs(C).
To prove lcs(C) ⊂ D, consider any x ∈ C. Then x is the convex combination of
deterministic matchings xk. For each ∅ 6= F ∈ F and each i, there is at most one j
with xki,j = 1. By the definition of independent edge set, then
∑
(i,j)∈F x
k
i,j ≤ kF . So∑
(i,j)∈F xi,j ≤ kF . It is clear that x satisfies the other inequalities related to every
Ji. So x ∈ D. Then it means that lcs(C) ⊂ D. 
A pseudo-market equilibrium implies a random matching x∗ (a probability distri-
bution over matchings) that is Pareto efficient. Of course, x∗ needs not be stable in
the game theoretic sense, but it corresponds to individual agents’ optimizing behav-
ior, as long as these agents take prices as given. Price taking behavior is a plausible
assumption in a large centrally-run market for partnerships, like for example a mar-
ket for roommates in college dormitories. A pseudo-market could be set up by the
college, and equilibrium prices could be enforced.
We finalize with a numerical example where stable matchings fail to exist, but
where our results deliver an efficient equilibrium (a market stability of sorts).
Example 1 (A market for roommates). Let I = {1, 2, 3} and L = 3. For agent i,
consuming object l is the same as having agent l as her roomate. Suppose that the
agents’ utilities are
1 2 3
1 0 1 2
2 2 0 1
3 1 2 0
With these preferences, there are no stable matchings. However, there is a HZ
equilibrium. In the equilibrium, the price of the following constraint is two:
x2,1 + x1,3 + x3,2 ≤ 1,
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the price of the following constraint is one:
x1,2 + x2,3 + x3,1 ≤ 1,
and the price of every other constraint is zero. Then, agent 1’s personalized price
vector is (0, 1, 2), 2’s personalized price vector is (2, 0, 1), and 3’s personalized price
vector is (1, 2, 0). All of them choose the consumption (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), and this is
the symmetric equilibrium assignment.
5.1. Coalition formation. The application to roommates can be adapted to a
general coalition-formation problem. Given a set of agents I, let O be the set of all
coalitions from I; that is, O = 2I\{∅}. A deterministic assignment is a partition
of agents into coalitions, and can be represented by a matrix x ∈ {0, 1}NL such
that xi,l = 1 if and only if i joints the coalition l ∈ O. Unit demand constraints
will imply that agents are members of a single coalition. We may then let C be
the convex hull of the set of deterministic assignments. Then there exists a pseudo-
market equilibrium, and the equilibrium assignment is a probability distribution
over coalitions.
5.2. Combinatorial allocation. Our methods can be used to solve general combi-
natorial assignment and matching problems (Budish, 2011, 2012). Here we discuss
allocation problems in which agents demand a bundle of objects, as in course allo-
cation. In contrast with Budish (2011), our emphasis is on random allocations, so
there are no problems arising from the lack of convexity of deterministic allocations.
There are obvious supply constraints, stemming from course capacities, but course
allocation may exhibit additional, and more problematic, constraints. For example,
if a school regards two courses l and l′ as complements, students must take both of
them or neither. Then we have the constraint xi,l = xi,l′. If the school regards two
courses l and l′ as substitutes, so that students have to take at most one of them,
then we have the constraint xi,l · xi,l′ = 0.
The set of feasible (random) assignments in course allocation problems cannot be
easily characterized. In particular, an assignment that seems ex-ante feasible may
not be actually implementable. The bihierarchy condition is not met. For example,
suppose there are three agents 1, 2, 3 and three objects a, b, c. Each object has one
copy. The set of bundles is O = {ab, ac, bc}. The following random assignment looks
ex-ante feasible because it satisfies unit demand constraints of agents and allocation
constraints of objects. But it is not feasible because bundles are not independent
objects. When a bundle is assigned, the other two bundles become unavailable.
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i ab ac bc
1 1/2 0 0
2 0 1/2 0
3 0 0 1/2
We can still apply our results by starting from a collection of deterministic assig-
ments. Let A be the basic set of “items,” each of which has a number of copies.
Let O ⊂ 2A be the set of bundles under consideration. A deterministic assignment
is represented by a matrix x ∈ {0, 1}NL such that xi,l = 1 if and only if i obtains
the bundle l ∈ O. Let C be the convex hull of the set of deterministic assignments.
Starting from C, one needs to pre-process lcs(C) and our theorem will deliver a
pseudo-market equilibrium with the desirable normative properties.
6. A market for “bads”
So far we have assumed that objects are “goods,” in the sense that agents’ utility
functions are monotone increasing. In some applications, however, objects represent
duties, or tasks, that agents dislike. Yet another application is to waste disposal,
or pollution. A certain minimum amount of such “bads” have to be allocated; the
question is to whom, and in which quantities?
The presence of bads gives rise to floor constraints, but we cannot use our previous
methods directly as all agents will choose zero consumption from their consumption
space. We can, however, borrow an idea from the standard model of labor markets:
labor supply is often described as consumption of leisure. We endow every agent
with a copy of every “bad,” and allow them to buy the options of not consuming a
bad. Such options become “goods,” and our previous methods apply.
Specifically, for every l ∈ O, ql denotes the minimum number of copies of l that
have to be assigned. Every agent can be assigned at most one object (unit demand).
If
∑
l∈O ql = N , then every agent must obtain an object so that the problem becomes
the one studied by Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979). Assume then that
∑
l∈O ql < N .
For every x ∈ ∆− and every i ∈ I, ui(x) is strictly decreasing in x: if x
′ > x, then
ui(x
′) < ui(x).
We consider a dual problem (I, O˜, ∆˜−, (u˜i)i∈I , (ql˜)l˜∈O˜) in which
• the set of objects is O˜ = {l˜}l∈O where every l˜ is an artificial object dual to
l ∈ O, and its supply is ql˜ = N − ql. When an agent i consumes an amount
a of l˜, it is understood that i consumes 1 − a of l. Because at least ql of l
need to be assigned, the number of copies of l˜ is N − ql.
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• The consumption space for every agent is ∆˜− = {x ∈ R
L
+ : xl˜ ∈ [0, 1] for every l ∈
O˜,
∑
l˜∈O˜ xl˜ ∈ [L− 1, L]}. So the amount of objects in O that i will consume
is L−
∑
l˜∈O˜ xl˜ ∈ [0, 1].
• Every agent i has the utility function u˜i such that for every x ∈ ∆˜−, u˜i(x) =
ui(1 − x). When ui is (semi-strictly) quasi-concave and strictly decreasing,
u˜i is (semi-strictly) quasi-concave and strictly increasing.
In the dual problem, agents can consume multiple artificial objects. We impose
floor constraints on individual consumption, and can derive the inequalities to char-
acterize lcs(C) as in Section 4.3. Then Theorem 1 applies to give a desirable outcome.
We omit the details.
7. Endowment and α-slack equilibrium
We turn to a version of our model in which objects are initially owned by agents
as endowments. Endowments are important in market design when the purpose is
to re-assign resources. Often, one wants to improve on an existing allocation. It is
then important to be able to respect agents’ property rights.10 Moreover, there are
models (such as time banks, briefly discussed in 7.5), in which the agents themselves
provide the goods that are to be allocated.
7.1. The economy and equilibrium. Now an economy is a tuple Γ = (I, O, (Zi, ui, ωi)i∈I),
where
• I is a finite set of agents ;
• O is a finite set of objects ;
• Zi ⊆ R
L
+ is i’s consumption space;
• ui : Zi → R is i’s utility function;
• ωi ∈ Zi is i’s endowment.
The aggregate endowment is denoted by ω¯ =
∑
i∈I ωi. For every l ∈ O, ω¯l is the
amount of l in the economy.
A constrained allocation problem with endowments is a pair (Γ, C) in which Γ is
an economy and C is a set of feasible assignments such that
(1) C is a polytope;
(2) ω = (ωi)i∈I ∈ C; that is, ω is feasible.
10Re-assignment problems give rise to political economy issues. The most basic issue is to ensure
that agents are not hurt in the re-allocation; that their property rights are respected.
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A feasible assignment x ∈ C is acceptable to agent i if ui(xi) ≥ ui(ωi); x is
individually rational (IR) if it is acceptable to all agents. We also define a notion of
approximate individual rationality: for any ε > 0, x is ε-individually rational (ε-IR)
if ui(xi) ≥ ui(ωi)− ε for all i ∈ I.
Let Xi and Ω
∗ be defined as before. We say two agents i and j are of equal type
if ωi = ωj, Xi = Xj, and for all (a, b) ∈ Ω
∗, ai = aj .
In a textbook exchange economy, Walrasian equilibrium assumes that agents’ in-
comes equal the value of their endowments at equilibrium prices. However, when
consumption space is bounded, agents may have satiated preferences. Then Wal-
rasian equilibrium may not exist; see Example 2 in Section 7.3.
Our method to solve the nonexistence problem is to introduce an arbitrarily small
exogenous budget. Given any price vector p, let pi be the personalized price vector
faced by i, as defined in Section 2.7. Then for any α ∈ [0, 1], we let i’s budget be
α + (1− α)pi · ωi.
So i’s income is a convex combination of the exogenous budget of 1 used in HZ (and
in our model of Section 2), and the market value of i’s endowment.
For any α ∈ [0, 1], we say (x∗, p∗) is an α-slack equilibrium if
(1) x∗i ∈ argmaxxi∈Xi{ui(xi) : p
∗
i · xi ≤ α + (1− α)p
∗
i · ωi};
(2) x∗ ∈ C;
(3) For any c = (a, b) ∈ Ω∗, a · x∗ < b implies that p∗c = 0.
Remark 2. Textbook Walrasian equilibria are 0-slack equilibria. The pseudo-market
equilibria we have already discussed in detail are 1-slack equilibria.
7.2. Results. We assume that for each c ∈ Ω∗,
∑
(i,l)∈supp(c) ωi,l > 0. A sufficient
condition for this assumption is that every agent owns a positive amount of every
object. Our next result is a generalization of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. Suppose that agents’ utility functions are continuous, quasi-concave
and strictly increasing. For any α ∈ (0, 1]:
• There exists an α-slack equilibrium (x∗, p∗), and x∗ is weakly C-constrained
Pareto efficient.
• If agents’ utility functions are semi-strictly quasi-concave, there exists an
α-slack equilibrium assignment x∗ that is C-constrained Pareto efficient.
• Every α-slack equilibrium assignment is equal-type envy-free.
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Theorem 2 ensures that we can choose α ∈ (0, 1] arbitrarily, but since prices are
endogenous it is not clear that the nominal magnitude of α has any actual meaning.
Our next result shows that it does. In fact, by choosing α arbitrarily small we ensure
that agents’ budgets approximate the market values of their endowments. In con-
sequence, the α-slack equilibrium obtained is approximately individually rational.
Theorem 3. Suppose that agents’ utility functions are continuous, semi-strictly
quasi-concave and strictly increasing. For any ε > 0, there is α ∈ (0, 1] and an
α-slack equilibrium (x∗, p∗) such that x∗ is C-constrained Pareto efficient and
max{ui(y) : y ∈ Xi and p
∗
i · y ≤ p
∗
i · ωi} − ui(x
∗
i ) < ε.
In particular, x∗ is ε-individually rational.
7.3. The Hylland and Zeckhauser example. A major application of Theorem 2
is to the object allocation model under the supply and unit demand constraints.
That is, Xi = ∆− for every i and x ∈ C if and only if
∑
i xi = ω¯. There are exactly
L inequalities in Ω∗, one for each object l, expressing that
∑
i xi,l ≤ ω¯l. All agents
face equal personalized prices, so we write pl for the price of l.
We present an example due to Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) showing that a
Walrasian equilibrium (a 0-slack equilibrium) may not exist, and show how the
symmetric Pareto efficient assignment in the example can be sustained as an α-
slack equilibrium with any α ∈ (0, 1].
Example 2. Given is an economy with three agents 1, 2, 3 and two objects a, b.
Object a has one copy and b has two copies. Agents have the following von-Neumann
Morgenstern utilities:
i ui,a ui,b
1 100 1
2 100 1
3 1 100
Endowments are ωi = (1/3, 2/3) for i = 1, 2, 3.
Claim 1. There is no Walrasian equilibrium in Example 2.
Proof. Suppose (towards a contradiction) that (x, p) is a Walrasian equilibrium.
Suppose first that pb > 0 and normalize it to one. Then all agents have the same
positive budget. If pa = 0, then 1 and 2 would each buy one copy of a, which is
a contradiction. So pa must be positive. The preferences of agents imply that 1
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and 2 must each obtain a half of a. Therefore, 1/3pa + 2/3 ≥ 1/2pb, and we obtain
pa ≤ 4. However, if pa < 4, 1 and 2 would spend all of their budgets on A, and
each obtain more than a half of a, which is a contradiction. So it must be that
1/3pa + 2/3 = 1/2pa and pa = 4. But this means that at most 3 demands b and b
must have excess supply, which is a contradiction.
Now suppose pb = 0 and pa > 0. Then 3 must obtain one copy of b. Since pa is
positive, 1 and 2 must each obtain a half of a. However, their budget 1/3pa cannot
afford such a consumption. 
Consider the assignment x defined by:
i xi,a xi,b
1 1/2 1/2
2 1/2 1/2
3 0 1
Claim 2. For any α ∈ (0, 1], the price vector p = ( 6α
1+2α
, 0) and the assignment x
constitute an α-slack equilibrium in Example 2.
Proof. For any α ∈ (0, 1] and i = 1, 2, 3,
α + (1− α)p · ωi = α + (1− α)
2α
1 + 2α
=
3α
1 + 2α
= p · xi.
With such budgets, agents 1 and 2 can only afford a 1/2 share of a and a 1/2 share of
b, which is the best consumption for them. Agent 3 chooses a copy of b for free. 
Note that in the above α-slack equilibrium, the endogenous value of agents’ en-
dowments is 2α/(1 + 2α). So the value of the exogenous part of the budget relative
to the value of the endogenous part is
α
(1− α)
2α
1 + 2α
→
1
2
as α → 0. So when α shrinks to zero, the value of the exogenous income is not
negligible. In the same spirit, the following proposition shows that the average
endogenous budget will always be below the exogenous budget of one. This means
that the economy needs outside “money.”
Proposition 4. If (x, p) is an α-slack equilibrium, then
1
N
N∑
i=1
p · ωi ≤ 1
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Proof. Note that p · (xi − ωi) ≤ α(1− p · ωi). Sum over i to obtain:
0 = p ·
(∑
i
xi − ω¯
)
≤ α(N − p · ω¯).

7.4. A market-based fairness property. In the object allocation model of Sec-
tion 7.3, agents face identical prices. It is possible to use our result to develop a
kind of fairness property in the presence of endowments. Fairness, in the sense of
absence of envy, is generally incompatible with individual rationality. Imagine an
economy with two objects, where both agents prefer object 1 over object 2, and all
the endowment of object 1 belongs to agent 1. Then, in any allocation, there will
either be envy, or agent 1’s individual rationality will be violated. So fairness has
to be amended to account for the presence of endowment.11
In the object allocation model with supply and unit demand constraints, in any
α-slack equilibrium, if agent i envies agent j then it must be that j’s endowment
is worth more than i’s at equilibrium prices. In a sense, this means that agents
collectively value j’s endowment more than i’s. Our next result formalizes this idea.
Proposition 5. In the object allocation model with supply and unit demand con-
straints, suppose that agents’ utility functions are concave and C1.12 Let (x, p) be
an α-slack equilibrium. Denote by S = {i : ui(xi) = max{ui(zi) : zi ∈ ∆−}} the set
of satiated agents, and by U = I \ S the set of others. Suppose that
∑
i∈U xi ≫ 0.
If i envies j in x (ui(xj) > ui(xi)), then p · ωj > p · ωi, and there exists welfare
weights θ ∈ RU++ such that if
v(t) = sup{
∑
i∈U
θiui(x˜i) : (x˜i) ∈ ∆
U
− and
∑
i∈U
x˜i ≤ ω¯ + t(ωi − ωj)−
∑
i∈S
xi},
then (xi)i∈U solves the problem for v(0), and v(t) < v(0) for all t small enough.
The meaning of Proposition 5 is that if an agent i envies agent j then j’s en-
dowment is more valuable than i’s in two senses. First, it is more valuable at
equilibrium prices. Second, the higher price valuation translates into a statement
about how much agents value the endowments. In particular, j’s endowment is
more valuable than i’s to a coalition of players U (a coalition that includes i!). It is
11The paper by Echenique, Miralles, and Zhang (2020) deals exclusively with this problem, but
proposes a very different solution.
12A function with domain D is C1 if it can be extended to a continuously differentiable function
defined on an open set that contains D.
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more valuable to U in the sense that there are welfare weights for the members of
U such that a change in agents’ endowment towards having more of i’s endowment
and less of j’s leads to a worse weighted utilitarian outcome. The result requires
that
∑
i∈U xi ≫ 0 simply to ensure that when we subtract ωj we do not force some
agent to consume negative quantities of some object.13
7.5. A market for time exchange. In organizations such as time banks, members
exchange time and skills without using monetary transfers.14 A time exchange prob-
lem can be described as an object allocation model with endowments. Formally, O
is the set of service types. For each agent i and service l, ωi,l is the amount of l
that i can provide. We could require that
∑
l∈O ωi,l ≤ 1 for all i and every agent’s
demand be no greater than one. Here “one” could mean one day, one week, or
one month. Services can be regarded as divisible because time is divisible. But of
course, in real life time is often measured in integers such as hours, days, or weeks.
Theorem 2 implies that we can find a market equilibrium to the problem. The value
of an agent’s endowment at equilibrium prices shows how much his endowment is
valued by all agents. When the value is higher, the agent is rewarded by a better
assignment.
8. Related Literature
Constrained resource allocation has received a lot of attention in recent years.
Budish, Che, Kojima, and Milgrom (2013) identify the bihierarchy structure of con-
straint blocks in the assignment matrix as the sufficient and necessary condition for
implementation. Akbarpour and Nikzad (forthcoming) extend this result by relax-
ing some constraints and considering approximate implementation. We circumvent
the implementation issue by taking the set of implementable assignments as the
primitive. Budish et al. allow for floor constraints in implementation but rule out
them in their applications. In their extension of the pseudo-market mechanism, they
consider column constraints, row constraints and sub-row constraints. By incorpo-
rating all row and sub-row constraints into agents’ consumption spaces, they prove
the existence of equilibria much like Hylland and Zeckhauser’s. Their extension is
a special case of ours. We can deal with more general constrains on both rows and
columns, and allow for floor constraints. When there are no floor constraints, we
13The
∑
i∈U xi ≫ 0 hypothesis in Proposition 5 is stronger than what we need. It suffices that
if ωj,l > 0 then
∑
i∈U xi,l > 0.
14See Andersson, Cseh, Ehlers, and Erlanson (2019) for more description of real-life time banks.
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directly price ceiling constraints, and when there are floor constraints, we translate
floor constraints into a different set of ceiling constraints.
Ehlers, Hafalir, Yenmez, and Yildirim (2014) focus on the problem of controlled
school choice (which was introduced by Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003)), whereby
school children have to be assigned seats at different schools to satisfy some diversity
objective.15 Kamada and Kojima (2015) are mainly (but not exclusively) motivated
by the problem of allocating doctors to hospitals to satisfy geographic quotas. The
objective of the quotas is to avoid an excessive concentration of doctors in urban
areas.16 Both papers proceed by adapting the notion of stability to capture the
presence of constraints, and to add structure to the constraints being considered.
To address more general constraints, Kamada and Kojima (2019) relax stability and
focus on feasible, individually rational, and fair assignments. They demonstrate that
the class of general upper-bound constraints on individual schools are the most per-
missive constraints under which a student-optimal fair matching exists. That class
rules out floor constraints. Our paper can deal with the same kinds of constraints
in the above papers, but we follow a different methodological tradition. Instead
of a two-sided game-theoretic matching model, we consider object allocation and
propose a competitive equilibrium solution. The above papers also investigate the
role of incentives in their mechanisms. We expect our pseudo-market mechanism
to be incentive compatible in large markets, but we choose to focus on existence,
efficiency and fairness.17
The recent work of Balbuzanov (2019) considers a version of the probabilistic
serial mechanism for object allocation subject to constraints. Like us, he works on
a one-sided object allocation model, but the focus on probabilistic serial makes his
analysis clearly distinct from ours. We borrow from this paper the idea, expressed
in Lemma 1, allowing us to focus on non-negative linear inequalities.
The use of markets over lottery shares to solve centralized allocation problems
was first proposed by Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979). They assume no constraints
other than unit demands and limited supply. They impose a fixed income for each
15Controlled school choice is also investigated by, among others, Ehlers (2010),
Hafalir, Yenmez, and Yildirim (2013), Kominers and So¨nmez (2013), Westkamp (2013),
Echenique and Yenmez (2015), Fragiadakis and Troyan (2017), Aygun and Bo´ (2017), and
Nguyen and Vohra (2017).
16See Kamada and Kojima (2017) for an overview.
17He, Miralles, Pycia, and Yan (2018) prove the asymptotic strategy-proofness of their pseudo-
market mechanism.
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agent, independent of prices. They also emphasize that equilibrium may not be ef-
ficient, and introduce the “cheapest bundle” property that we employ as well in our
version of the first welfare theorem. Many other papers have followed Hylland and
Zeckhauser in analyzing competitive equilibria as solutions in market design; see
for instance, Budish (2011), Ashlagi and Shi (2015), Hafalir and Miralles (2015),
He, Miralles, Pycia, and Yan (2018). Miralles and Pycia (2020) establish the sec-
ond welfare theorem for the market with satiated preferences and token money:
every Pareto efficient assignment may be supported in a Walrasian equilibrium with
properly chosen budgets. But none of these papers consider constrained allocation
problems.
Hylland and Zeckhauser make the point that an equilibrium may not exist in
a model with endowments. Like us, Mas-Colell (1992), Le (2017) and McLennan
(2018) also propose to avoid the non-existence issue by means of a hybrid income
between the exogenous budget and the endogenous Walrasian income. A version
of the hybrid model was first introduced by Mas-Colell (1992), who presents an
existence result with income that is the sum of a fixed income and a price-dependent
income. His result requires the first component to be determined endogenously as
part of the fixed point argument in the equilibrium existence result. Aside from
the presence of constraints, our result differs from his by allowing us to obtain
approximate individual rationality with a small exogenous α. In Le’s (2017) notion
of equilibrium, two identical objects may have different prices. As a consequence,
there may be envy among identical agents, and it may be necessary for some agents
to purchase a more expensive copy of an object when a cheaper one is available.18
Envy among equals is problematic for normative reasons, and it is hard to implement
such equilibria in a decentralized fashion.19
18In Example 2, a Le’s equilibrium is as follows. Let p = (100, 1, 101
2
) be a price vector in which
the latter two elements are the prices of the two copies of B. Then all agents have an income of
101/2. The unique optimal bundle for agents 1 and 2 is xi = (1/2, 1/2, 0). Agent 3 is willing to
spend all his income on buying the more expensive copy of B, so x3 = (0, 0, 1).
Consider a variation of the example in which endowments become ω1 = (1/3, 1/2, 1/6), ω2 =
(1/3, 1/6, 1/2), and ω3 = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3). Then p = (100, 1,
101
2
) is still an equilibrium price, with
x1 = (
5
12
, 7
12
, 0), x2 = (
7
12
, 5
12
, 0), and x3 = (0, 0, 1) being the equilibrium assignment. Observe
that agent 1 envies 2, despite they have the same utility and the same endowment: 1/3 of A and
2/3 of B.
19One could interpret different prices for different copies of the same object as a novel endogenous
transfer scheme, but we are unaware of a normative defense of this idea.
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McLennan (2018) presents an existence result for equilibrium with “slack” in a
general model that allows for production and encompasses our model as a special
case. But his notion of equilibrium with slack differs from ours in important ways.
Agents in his (and our) model may be satiated, and his notion of slack controls the
distribution of transfers from satiated agents who spend less than their income to
unsatiated agents. In contrast, our α parameter controls the role of endowments,
allowing for α to specify the weight of equal incomes vs. (unequal) endowments. In
fact, it is possible to construct an example to illustrate the difference between the
two notions of equilibrium. In the example no agents are satiated, so the slack in
McLennan’s notion has no role to play, and his equilibrium allocations are indepen-
dent of α; in contrast, our equilibrium allocations range from equal division to the
autartical consumption of endowments, as α ranges from placing all weight on the
exogenous income, to placing all weight on initial endowments.20
Kojima, Sun, and Yu (2020) and Gul, Pesendorfer, and Zhang (2019) consider
market equilibrium in economies with gross substitutes utilities and constraints. Ko-
jima et. al characterize the constraints that preserve the gross substitutes property
of firms’ demands in a transferable utility model (Kelso and Crawford’s (1982) job
matching model). Gross substitutes ensure equilibrium existence, and the authors
show that the constraint structures have to take the form of “interval constraints.”
Gul et. al prove the existence of equilibrium in economies with a finite number
of indivisible objects, and limited transfers or no transfers. They show that with
limited transfers or no transfers, equilibrium requires random allocations and can
be approached by the equilibrium with full transfers. They also show that equilib-
rium allocations satisfying certain constraints can be constructed by building these
constraints into utility functions or incorporating them into a production technol-
ogy. Different from them, we price constraints and can accommodate more general
preferences and constraint structures.
Related to our applications, Manjunath (2016) proposes a competitive equilib-
rium notion for a two-sided fractional matching market. The double-indexed price
system in his notion resembles our personalized price system, but he needs to
deal with both sides’ preferences. As a consequence, his equilibrium exists when
there are transfers, but only approximately exists when transfers are forbidden.
Andersson, Cseh, Ehlers, and Erlanson (2019) propose a time exchange model in
which each agent provides a distinct service and has dichotomous preferences. They
20We are grateful to Andy McLennan for this example, which can be found in his paper.
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propose a priority mechanism to maximize the amount of exchanges among agents.
Differently, in our model of time exchange an agent can provide multiple services
and different agents can provide the same service. Agents can express richer prefer-
ences and the prices in our market solution reveal on which service agents have more
demand. Bogomolnaia, Moulin, Sandomirskiy, and Yanovskaia (2017, 2019) study
the competitive equilibrium allocation of a mixed manna that contains “goods” and
“bads”. They prove that an equilibrium always exists. Our model is different than
theirs in that agents have unit-demand constraints. So their existence result does
not hold in our paper.
Finally, the recent work by Root and Ahn (2020) looks at constrained allocation
from a mechanism design perspective. They allow for very general constraint sets,
and prove a characterization of group strategy proof rules.
9. Proof of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2
We first prove the theorem by assuming that all utility functions are semi-strictly
quasi-concave. We then explain the differences when utility functions are only quasi-
concave. We also explain how the proof works for Theorem 1.
With an abuse of notation, we write
∑
l∈O pi,lxi,l as pi · xi. For each c ∈ Ω
∗, we
have assumed that
∑
(i,l)∈supp(c) ωi,l > 0. It implies that
∑
(i,l)∈supp(c) a
c
i,lωi,l > 0 (we
write c = (ac, bc)).
We define a price ceiling
p¯ =
2N
minc∈Ω∗
∑
(i,l)∈supp(c) a
c
i,lωi,l
,
and a price space P = [0, p¯]|Ω
∗|.
Given α ∈ (0, 1], for every p ∈ P, define
vi = max{ui(xi) : xi ∈ Xi},
Bi(p, α) = {xi ∈ Xi : pi · xi ≤ α + (1− α)pi · ωi},
di(p) = argmax{ui(xi) : xi ∈ Bi(p, α)},
di(p) = argmin{p · xi : xi ∈ di(p)},
Vi(p) = max{ui(xi) : xi ∈ Bi(p, α)}.
Lemma 2. If Vi(p) < vi then di(p) = di(p).
Proof. Let xi ∈ di(p). We shall prove that pi · xi = α + (1 − α)pi · ωi, which
means we are done because it implies that all bundles in di(p) cost the same at
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prices p. Let zi ∈ Xi be such that ui(zi) = vi > ui(xi). For any ε ∈ (0, 1),
since Xi is convex, εzi + (1 − ε)xi ∈ Xi. By the semi-strict quasi-concavity of ui,
ui(εzi + (1− ε)xi) > ui(xi). This means that, for any ε ∈ (0, 1),
εpi · zi + (1− ε)pi · xi > α+ (1− α)pi · ωi.
But this is only possible, for arbitrarily small ε, if pi · xi ≥ α + (1− α)pi · ωi. Since
xi ∈ Bi(p, α), we have pi · xi = α + (1− α)pi · ωi. 
Lemma 3. If Vi(p) = vi, then
di(p) = argmin{pi · xi : ui(xi) = vi and xi ∈ Xi}.
Proof. Let xi ∈ di(p). Then for any zi ∈ Xi with pi ·zi < pi ·xi, we have zi ∈ Bi(p, α).
So ui(zi) < vi by definition of di. Therefore, if zi ∈ argmin{pi · xi : ui(xi) =
vi and xi ∈ Xi}, then
pi · zi = pi · xi,
and therefore
di(p) ⊇ argmin{pi · xi : ui(xi) = vi and xi ∈ Xi}.
The converse set inclusion follows similarly because if xi is not in the right-hand set,
there would exist zi ∈ Xi with pi · zi < pi · xi and ui(zi) = vi, which is not possible
as such zi would be in Bi(p, α). 
Lemma 4. di is upper hemicontinuous.
Proof. Let (xn, pn) → (x, p), with xn ∈ di(p
n). Suppose that there is x′ ∈ Bi(p, α)
with ui(x
′) > ui(x). If pi · x
′ < α + (1 − α)pi · ωi, then this strict inequality
will be true for pn with n large enough; a contradiction, as ui is continuous. If
pi ·x
′ = α+(1−α)pi ·ωi, then α > 0 implies that pi ·x
′ > 0. Then there is λ ∈ (0, 1)
large enough that ui(λx
′) > ui(x), pi · (λx
′) < pi · x
′, and λx′ ∈ Xi (recall that the
construction of Xi ensures that this is the case)). The argument for the case of a
strict inequality then applies. 
Remark 3. Lemma 4 uses crucially that α > 0.
Lemma 5. di(p) is upper hemi-continuous.
Proof. To prove upper hemi-continuity, we shall prove that di has a closed graph.
Let (xni , p
n)→ (xi, p) with x
n
i ∈ di(p
n) for all n.
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First, consider the case where Vi(p) < vi. By the maximum theorem, Vi is contin-
uous, so Vi(p
n) < vi for all large enough n. Then Lemma 2 implies that xi ∈ di(p)
as di is upper hemi-continuous.
Second, consider the case where Vi(p) = vi. We know that xi ∈ di(p) as di is
upper hemi-continuous. Suppose (towards a contradiction) that xi /∈ di(p). Then
there is yi ∈ di(p) with
pi · yi < pi · xi ≤ α + (1− α)pi · ωi.
Then for all n large enough,
pni · yi < α + (1− α)pi · ωi.
Since yi ∈ di(p) and Vi(p) = vi, ui(y) = vi. This means that Vi(p
n) = vi for all n
large enough, as yi ∈ Bi(p
n, α). Then, by Lemma 3, xni ∈ argmin{p
n
i · xi : ui(xi) =
vi and xi ∈ Xi} for all n large enough. But the correspondence
p 7→ argmin{pi · xi : ui(xi) = vi and x ∈ Xi}.
is upper hemicontinous, by the maximum theorem. So
xi ∈ argmin{pi · xi : ui(xi) = vi and x ∈ Xi},
which is a contradiction. 
It is easy to see that di(p) is nonempty, compact- and convex-valued. So di(p) is
also nonempty, compact- and convex-valued. For every c ∈ Ω∗, define the aggregate
demand on c by
Dc(p) =
∑
(i,l)∈supp(c)
aci,ldi,l(p) = ∪{a · x : x ∈ ×idi(p)}.
Define the aggregate demand correspondence by
D(p) = (Dc(p))c∈Ω∗ ,
and the excess demand correspondence by
z(p) = D(p)− {b},
where b = (bc)c∈Ω∗ .
Consider the correspondence ϕ : P → P defined by
ϕc(p) = {min{max{0, zc + pc}, p¯} : z ∈ z(p)} for all c ∈ Ω
∗.
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D(p), and therefore z(p), are upper hemicontinuous, convex-valued, and compact-
valued. Thus, ϕ is upper hemi-continuous, convex-valued and compact-valued. By
Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, there exists p∗ ∈ P with p∗ ∈ ϕ(p∗).
Note that there exists z∗ ∈ z(p∗) such that
(4) p∗c = min{max{0, z
∗
c + p
∗
c}, p¯} for all c ∈ Ω
∗.
Choose x∗ ∈ RNL+ such that x
∗
i ∈ di(p
∗) for all i and a · x∗ − b = z∗(a,b) for all
(a, b) ∈ Ω∗. We shall prove that (x∗, p∗) is an α-slack Walrasian equilibrium.
Lemma 6. p∗ · z∗ ≥ 0.
Proof. If p∗ · z∗ < 0, then there is some c ∈ Ω∗ with p∗c > 0 and z
∗
c < 0. By
Equation 4, then, p∗c = p
∗
c + z
∗
c , which is not possible as z
∗
c < 0. 
Lemma 7. p∗c < p¯ for all c ∈ Ω
∗.
Proof. Suppose towards a contradiction that there exists c∗ ∈ Ω∗ for which p∗c∗ = p¯.
Then p∗c > 0. Now, x
∗
i ∈ Bi(p
∗, α) means that
p∗i · x
∗
i ≤ α + (1− α)p
∗
i · ωi,
which is equivalent to
p∗i · (x
∗
i − ωi) ≤ α(1− p
∗
i · ωi).
Summing over i, we obtain that∑
i∈I
p∗i · (x
∗
i − ωi) ≤ α(N −
∑
i∈I
p∗i · ωi),
which is equivalent to
(5)
∑
i∈I
∑
l∈O
p∗i,l(x
∗
i,l − ωi,l) ≤ α(N −
∑
i∈I
∑
l∈O
p∗i,lωi,l)
Note that ∑
i∈I
∑
l∈O
p∗i,lωi,l =
∑
i∈I
∑
l∈O
( ∑
c∈Ω∗:(i,l)∈supp(c)
aci,lp
∗
c
)
ωi,l
=
∑
c∈Ω∗
p∗c
( ∑
(i,l)∈supp(c)
aci,lωi,l
)
(6)
Now, by definition of p¯, we have that∑
c∈Ω∗
p∗c
( ∑
(i,l)∈supp(c)
aci,lωi,l
)
≥ p¯
( ∑
(i,l)∈supp(c∗)
ac
∗
i,lωi,l
)
≥ p¯min
c∈Ω∗
( ∑
(i,l)∈supp(c)
aci,lωi,l
)
= 2N.
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Thus, using this inequality and equations (5) and (6), we obtain that
(7)
∑
i∈I
∑
l∈O
p∗i,l(x
∗
i,l − ωi,l) ≤ α(N −
∑
i∈I
∑
l∈O
p∗i,lωi,l) < 0.
On the other hand,
p∗ · z∗ =
∑
c∈Ω∗
p∗c
( ∑
(i,l)∈supp(c)
aci,lx
∗
i,l − b
c
)
.
≤
∑
c∈Ω∗
p∗c
( ∑
(i,l)∈supp(c)
aci,lx
∗
i,l −
∑
(i,l)∈supp(c)
aci,lωi,l
)
(8)
=
∑
i∈I
∑
l∈O
∑
{c∈Ω∗ st (i,l)∈supp(c)}
p∗ca
c
i,l(x
∗
i,l − ωi,l)
=
∑
i∈I
∑
l∈O
p∗i,l(x
∗
i,l − ωi,l)(9)
< 0,(10)
where (8) follows because for each c ∈ Ω∗,
∑
(i,l)∈supp(c) a
c
i,lωi,l ≤ b
c, (9) follows as
p∗i,l =
∑
{c∈Ω∗ st (i,l)∈supp(c)}
p∗ca
c
i,l,
and (10) follows from (7).
Finally, (10) is absurd as it contradicts Lemma 6. 
Proof of Theorem 2. We claim that (x∗, p∗) is an α-slack Walrasian equilibrium. If
p∗c > 0, since p
∗
c < p¯, then p
∗
c = z
∗
c + p
∗
c , which implies z
∗
c = 0. If p
∗
c = 0, then
z∗c + p
∗
c ≤ 0, which implies z
∗
c ≤ 0. Recall that z
∗
c = a
c · x∗ − bc. So this implies that
x∗ satisfies all inequalities in Ω∗. By definition of Xi, x
∗ satisfies then all inequalities
in Ω. Hence,
x∗ ∈ lcs(C).
Moreover, if z∗c < 0, it must be that p
∗
c = 0, as p
∗
c > 0 implies z
∗
c = 0.
It remains to show that x∗ ∈ C. Suppose to the contrary that x∗ /∈ C. Since
x∗ ∈ lcs(C), there exists x′ ∈ C such that x∗ ≤ x′. Then x∗ 6= x′, so there is
(i∗, l∗) ∈ I ×O with x∗i∗,l∗ < x
′
i∗,l∗ . By definition of C, x
′
i∗ ∈ Zi.
Consider yi∗ defined as yi∗,l = x
∗
i∗,l for all l 6= l
∗, and yi∗,l∗ = x
′
i∗,l∗ . Since x
′ ∈ C
and x′i∗,l∗ > 0, l
∗ cannot be a forbidden object for i∗. Hence, x′i∗ ∈ Xi∗ and therefore
yi∗ ∈ Xi.
38 ECHENIQUE, MIRALLES, AND ZHANG
Moreover, for any c = (a, b) ∈ Ω∗, if (i∗, l∗) ∈ supp(c) then a · x∗ < a · x′ ≤ b and
therefore z∗c < 0 (c must not be binding at x
∗). Hence p∗c = 0. In consequence,∑
l∈O
p∗i∗,lyi∗,l =
∑
l 6=l∗
p∗i∗,lyi∗,l +
( ∑
(a,b)∈Ω∗
p∗(a,b)ai∗,l∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
)
yi∗,l∗
=
∑
l 6=l∗
p∗i∗,lx
∗
i∗,l
≤ α + (1− α)p∗i · ωi.
Thus yi∗ ∈ Bi∗(p
∗, α) and x∗i∗ < yi∗ , contradicting the strict monotonicity of ui∗ and
that x∗i ∈ di(p
∗).
We next prove that x∗ is C-constrained Pareto efficient. Suppose towards a con-
tradiction that x is an feasible allocation that Pareto dominates x∗. Given that
x ∈ C, xi ∈ Xi. Then, for all i ∈ I, ui(xi) ≥ ui(x
∗
i ), so by definition of di we have
that
p∗i · xi ≥ p
∗
i · x
∗
i .
And for some j ∈ I, uj(xj) > uj(x
∗
j ), so by utility maximization,
p∗j · xj > p
∗
j · x
∗
j .
Thus, ∑
i∈I
p∗i · xi >
∑
i∈I
p∗i · x
∗
i .
This is equivalent to∑
c∈Ω∗
p∗c
( ∑
(i,l)∈supp(c)
aci,lxi,l
)
>
∑
c∈Ω∗
p∗c
( ∑
(i,l)∈supp(c)
aci,lx
∗
i,l
)
.
So there must exist c ∈ Ω∗ such that p∗c > 0 and∑
(i,l)∈supp(c)
aci,lxi,l >
∑
(i,l)∈supp(c)
aci,lx
∗
i,l.
However, p∗c > 0 implies that z
∗
c = 0 (c is binding at x
∗), and thus x violates c and
is not feasible, which is a contradiction.
Equal-type envy-freeness follows the fact that agents of equal type have equal
consumption space and equal budgets, and face equal personalized prices. 
Remark 4. The proof uses semi-strict quasi-concavity only in the proof of upper
hemicontinuity of di. To prove existence of an equilibrium without imposing the
cheapest-bundle property, observe that continuity and quasiconcavity of ui is enough
to ensure that di is upper hemicontinuous, and convex- and compact-valued. If z
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is defined from di in place of di, the proof can be written same as above. To
prove that every α-slack equilibrium assignment x∗ is weakly C-constrained Pareto
efficient, suppose towards a contradiction that there exists a feasible assignment x
such that for all i ∈ I, ui(xi) > ui(x
∗
i ). By utility maximization, for all i ∈ I,
p∗i · xi > p
∗
i · x
∗
i .
Thus, ∑
i∈I
p∗i · xi >
∑
i∈I
p∗i · x
∗
i .
So we obtain a contradiction as before.
Remark 5 (Proof of Theorem 1). The above proof can be easily adapted to prove
Theorem 1. We first change the price space to be P = [0, p¯]|Ω
∗|, where
p¯ =
N
bmin
+ 1, and bmin = min{b : (a, b) ∈ Ω
∗}.
By letting α = 1, Lemma 2 to Lemma 6 do not change.
Lemma 7 becomes easier to prove. Suppose p∗c = p¯ for some c ∈ Ω
∗. Then
z∗c +p
∗
c ≥ p¯ implies that z
∗
c ≥ 0. So c must be binding, and for every (i, l) ∈ supp(c),
p∗i,l ≥ ai,lp
∗
c . However, this is impossible because∑
(i,l)∈supp(c) ai,lx
∗
i,l ≤
∑
(i,l)∈supp(c) ai,l
1
p∗i,l
≤
∑
(i,l)∈supp(c)
1
p∗c
≤
N
p∗c
< bmin.
Then we can prove as above that (x∗, p∗) is a pseudo-market equilibrium, and x∗ is
(weakly) C-constrained Pareto efficient.
10. Proof of Theorem 3
Let dH denote the Hausdorff distance between two sets in R
L. So,
dH(A,B) = max{sup{inf{‖x−y‖ : y ∈ B} : x ∈ A}, sup{inf{‖x−y‖ : x ∈ A} : y ∈ B}}.
Let Bi(p, α) denote the budget set of agent i given a price vector p and slack
α ∈ [0, 1]. Let B¯i(p, α) = {xi ∈ Xi : pi · xi ≤ α + (1 − α)pi · ωi} denote the budget
line. Note that Bi(p, α) = {xi ∈ Xi : ∃y ∈ B¯i(p, α) s.t. x ≤ y}.
Lemma 8. For any δ > 0, there is α > 0 such that if p is an α-slack equi-
librium price vector found in Theorem 2, then for any i, either pi · ωi < 1 or
dH(B¯i(p, α), B¯i(p, 0)) < δ.
Proof. Consider the price p¯ defined in the proof of Theorem 2. If p is a price obtained
in Theorem 2, then p ∈ [0, p¯]|Ω
∗|. Note that p¯ is independent of α.
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Let K = sup{‖x‖ : x ∈ Xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N}. Now choose α ∈ (0, 1) such that
sup{
∣∣∣∣1− α + (1− α)pi · ωipi · ωi
∣∣∣∣K : p ∈ [0, p¯]|Ω∗| and pi · ωi ≥ 1} < δ
Observe that when pi · ωi ≥ 1, Bi(p, α) ⊆ Bi(p, 0). So for any x ∈ Bi(p, α),
inf{‖x− y‖ : y ∈ B¯i(p, 0)} = ‖x− x‖ = 0. Hence,
sup{inf{‖x− y‖ : y ∈ B¯i(p, 0)}, x ∈ B¯i(p, α)} = 0.
On the other hand, if we let x ∈ B¯i(p, 0), then γx ∈ B¯i(p, α), where
γ =
α + (1− α)pi · ωi
pi · ωi
.
Since γ ≤ 1, γ ∈ Xi.
Note that
‖x− γx‖ = |1− γ| ‖x‖ < δ.
Thus inf{‖x− y‖ : y ∈ B¯i(p, α)} < δ, and therefore
sup{inf{‖x− y‖ : y ∈ B¯i(p, α)}, x ∈ B¯i(p, 0)} < δ.
Thus dH(Bi(p, 0), Bi(p, α)) < δ. 
To prove the theorem, let δ > 0 be such that, for any p ∈ [0, p¯]Ω
∗
, if dH(Bi(p, 0), Bi(p, α)) <
δ then
|max{ui(x) : x ∈ Bi(p, α)} −max{ui(x) : x ∈ Bi(p, 0)}| < ε.
For such δ, let α be as in Lemma 8.
For any i, if pi · ωi < 1 then Bi(p, 0) ⊆ Bi(p, α), so
max{ui(y) : y ∈ ∆− and pi · y ≤ pi · ωi} − ui(x) < 0 < ε.
If, on the contrary, pi ·ωi ≥ 1, then Lemma 8 implies that dH(Bi(p, 0), Bi(p, α)) < δ,
and the result follows from the definition of δ.
11. Proof of Proposition 5
Our first observation establishes the relation between envy and the value of en-
dowments at equilibrium prices.
Lemma 9. Let (x, p) be a Walrasian equilibrium with slack α ∈ (0, 1]. If i envies
j, then p · (xj − xi) > 0 and p · (ωj − ωi) > 0.
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Proof. Let i envy j, so ui(xj) > ui(xi). Then utility maximization implies that
α + (1− α)p · ωj ≥ p · xj > α + (1− α)p · ωi ≥ p · xi,
where the strict inequality follows because xj ∈ ∆−. So p · (xj − xi) > 0 and
p · (ωj − ωi) > 0. 
Now consider a α-slack Walrasian equilibrium (x, p). Agent i’s maximization
problem is:
max
x∈RL
+
ui(x) + λi(Ii − p · x) + γi(1− 1 · x)
Where Ii = α + (1 − α)p · ωi, λi is a multiplier for the budget constraint, and γi
for the
∑
l xi,l ≤ 1 constraint.
Utility functions are C1. The first-order conditions for the maximization problems
are then:
∂lui(xi)− λipl − gi

= 0 if xi,l > 0≤ 0 if xi,l = 0,
where ∂lui(xi) denotes the partial derivative of ui with respect to xi,l.
Observe that if p · xi < α + (1 − α)p · ωi, then the budget constraint is not
binding and λi = 0. As a consequence, ui(xi) = max{ui(zi) : zi ∈ ∆−}. Let
S = {i ∈ [N ] : p · xi < α + (1 − α)p · ωi} be the set of satiated consumers. Let
U = {i ∈ [N ] : p · xi = α + (1 − α)p · ωi} be the set of unsatiated, and observe that
we can let λi > 0 for all i ∈ U . Consider the two stage social program:
Stage 1:
maxy˜∈(∆−)S
∑
i∈S ui(y˜i)
Stage 2:
maxy˜∈(∆−)U
∑
i∈U
1
λi
ui(y˜i)∑
i∈U y˜i ≤ ω¯ −
∑
i∈S xi
Note that (xi)i∈S solves Stage 1, while satisfying
∑
i∈S xi ≤ w¯, and that given
(xi)i∈S, (xi)i∈U solves Stage 2. That this is so follows from the fact that (xi)i∈U
solves the first-order conditions for the Stage 2 problem with Lagrange multiplier p
for the constraint that
∑
i∈U y˜i ≤ ω¯ −
∑
i/∈S xi.
Now use the assumption that
∑
i∈U xi ≫ 0. This means that there exists t¯ > 0
such that if t ∈ (0, t¯] then the set of y˜ ∈ (∆−)
U such that
∑
i∈U y˜i ≤ ω¯ + t(ωi −
ωj) −
∑
i/∈S xi is nonempty (and, for constraint qualification, contains an element
that satisfies all constraints with slack).
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Consider the problem
maxy˜∈(∆U
−
)
∑
i∈U
1
λi
ui(y˜i)∑
i∈U y˜i ≤ ω¯ + t(ωi − ωj)−
∑
i∈S xi
Note that for each t ∈ (0, t¯] there exists (ν(t), γ(t), α(t)) such that
v(t) = sup{
∑
i∈U
1
λi
ui·y˜i+ν(t)·(ω¯−
∑
i∈S
y˜i+t(ωi−ωj))−
∑
i∈U
y˜i)+
∑
i∈U
γi(t)(1−
∑
l∈O
y˜i,l)+
∑
i∈U
αi(t)y˜i,l.}
Here ν(t) is the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint that
∑
i∈U y˜i ≤ ω¯−
∑
i∈S xi+
t(ωi − ωj), while γ(t) and α(t) are the Lagrange multipliers for the constraint that
(y˜i) ∈ (∆−)
N . Choose a selection (ν(t), γ(t), α(t)) such that ν(0) = p.
Let ω˜ = ω¯ −
∑
i∈S xi. The saddle point inequalities imply that
(t′ − t)ν(t) · (ωi − ωj) =
∑
i∈U
1
λi
ui(xi(t
′)) + ν(t) · (ω˜ + t′(ωi − ωj)−
∑
i∈U
xi(t
′))
+
∑
i∈U
γi(t)(1−
∑
l∈O
xi,l(t
′)) +
∑
i∈U
αi(t)xi,l(t
′)
−
(∑
i∈U
1
λi
ui(xi(t
′)) + ν(t) · (ω˜ + t(ωi − ωj)−
∑
i∈U
xi(t
′))
+
∑
i∈U
γi(t)(1−
∑
l∈O
xi,l(t
′)) +
∑
i∈U
αi(t)xi,l(t
′)
)
≥ v(t′)− v(t)
Now recall that ν(0) = p. Then Lemma 9, together with the above inequality,
imply that
0 > p · (ωi − ωj)t
′ ≥ v(t′)− v(0)
for all t′ > 0 with t′ ≤ t¯.
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